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The Yellow River, China. Source: Flickr
user Bert van Dijk
This discussion of the role of national governments in relation to river management uses
three examples to highlight major themes – the Yellow River, the Colorado and the Murray-
Darling system. I will argue that river management has requirements that only governments
can hope to meet. Other types of organisations or institutions can assume responsibility for
at best one or a few aspects of the whole. Even if governments cannot take account of all
eventualities – as is undoubtedly the case – they can go further than any other institutional
option in their  capacity to respond comprehensively to the difficult  issues facing river
management. This capacity is evident in a number of areas. First is the access of national
governments to enormous resources in areas such as funds, research and management.
Second is the capacity to assess issues from a catchment wide perspective and distribute
costs and benefits between different stakeholders, particularly upstream and downstream.
Third is the ability to create frameworks of laws and regulations to which other individuals
and other institutions have to respond.  Fourth is  the potential  for  a  higher degree of
corporate consistency over the long term (although religious organisations such as the
Catholic Church are perhaps even more successful in that regard).
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Yellow River
The Yellow River has been chosen to focus the initial discussion. It is one of the most
productive and destructive rivers on the planet and its management has been a primary
responsibility  of  Chinese  governments  for  thousands  of  years.  The  productivity  made
possible by the Yellow River has provided the economic surpluses that have supported
brilliant  civilizations  in  the  region  since  the  second  millennium BCE,  but  its  periodic
breakouts and changes in direction as it threads across more than five thousand kilometres
of western and northern China have caused some of the worst disasters in recorded history.
The flood of 1931, for example, is estimated to have drowned up to four million people. The
capacity  to  harness  its  productivity  has  provided  Chinese  Governments  with  vast  tax
revenues but  inability  to  stop the river  periodically  flooding and changing course  has
historically  been  a  serious  threat  to  their  continued  legitimacy.   This  was  true  of
governments four thousand years ago when the strong Chinese State first developed and it
is still true today when the challenges facing officials responsible for managing the river are
being intensified by the high rate of extraction and the prospect of climate change which is
predicted to result in more intense floods and droughts in a long term drying trend.
The river’s productivity and potential for destruction both derive from the volumes of silt
that it carried down from the upper catchment. When it overflows its banks on the flood
plain along its middle reaches and the water slows down it loses energy and the capacity to
carry as much silt as it did when flowing rapidly. The silt coming out of suspension is then
deposited in the bottom of the river channel and alongside on the flood plain raising the
river and its banks still further. As a result, for hundreds of kilometres the Yellow River
stands many metres higher than the surrounding densely populated plain.  When a break
occurs flood waters soon extend over large areas with catastrophic impacts on people with
limited resources to protect themselves. Over thousands of years the Chinese state has
devoted enormous effort strengthening the banks and supporting dykes and attempting to
maintain the integrity of the river banks. The catchment of the Yellow River is subject to a
highly variable climate resulting in frequent floods, some of enormous proportions that it is
difficult  or  impossible  to  contain.  Since  records  first  began  to  be  kept  catastrophic
breakouts have occurred every century or so, the last in 1938. (In that case deliberately
done by the Nationalist government to slow Japanese troops which it did for a few weeks at
the cost of hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilian lives). As a result of these breakouts
the river has sometimes changed its path across the plain and re-entered the sea hundreds
of kilometres north or south of its previous estuary.
In addition to the flows coming from the headwaters in Tibet there are three factors which
exacerbate the danger of flooding. These are silt deposits, ice dams that sometimes form in
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winter  in  the  two  reaches  of  the  river  which  extend  far  to  the  north  and,  perhaps
paradoxically, reduced flows during non-flood times as a result of intense demand from
agriculture, industry and human consumption across a region populated by more than four
hundred million people.
The Yellow River carries more silt per unit volume of water than any large river (about
double that of the Colorado River and three times the Mississippi). Most of the silt comes
from erosion in the middle reaches as it  passes through the Loess plateau. To reduce
erosion in that region the government has undertaken a series of payment-for-ecosystems-
services schemes and rural development projects, the largest of their kind worldwide, to
promote crops, horticulture and vegetation to hold the fine soils in place. These measures
are estimated to have reduced silt loads by about 30%. It has also built the large Xiaolangdi
Dam to act as a silt trap and supply water to flush the river. As the river flows into the dam
and slows down it drops its silt to the floor of the storage. Forecasts are that the dam will be
effective for another ten or twenty years by which time it will be full of deposited silt and
river managers will need to find other options.
Central to the story is the impact of reduced flow due to increasing demand. During the
1980s, 1990s and early 2000s there were many years when the river no longer reached the
sea. In 1997 flow stopped for 226 days and the last 800 kilometres of the river was dry.
These periods of  no flow devastated irrigation in  the lower reaches and caused great
difficulties for urban centres which had to get water from elsewhere. In addition it also
reduced the capacity of the river to flush silt through the system and increased the flood
risk. Reduced volumes of water left in the river means that the flow speed is also slower
which causes silt to drop out of suspension sooner. When the river mouth closes the silt
which is still being mobilized upstream has to be deposited elsewhere. During times of low
flows it is deposited in the river channel itself thereby reducing its size and the volume that
can be held in the river before flooding occurs. With the mouth blocked deposits from small
floods also lift the height of the river banks and sometimes obliterate the major channel
which is difficult to recreate. When a significant flood occurs uncontrolled breakouts then
become unavoidable with a high risk of disaster.
In 2002 the national government responded by introducing strict limits on extractions in
upstream  provinces  and  an  elaborate  system  of  monitoring  and  real  time  control  of
diversions which allow the central authority to cut off diversions when trigger points are hit.
This is complemented by an elaborate system of compensation to spread costs between
stakeholders upstream and downstream. As a result there have been no periods of non-flow
since 2002. The river managers have also developed river pulsing techniques based on large
releases for short periods from river storages to push silt through the system and hopefully
The role of national governments in river management
Global Water Forum www.globalwaterforum.org | 4
out of the estuary. Not surprisingly the water shortages in North China are also creating
great incentives to improve water use efficiency and a wide range of reforms are being
pursued by the Chinese government including water trading. Beyond this is the massive
south-to-north water transfer scheme with its three routes designed to divert some of the
much larger flow of the Yangtze for the benefit of the more meagre Yellow River. The most
eastern of the three routes follows the Grand Canal first put in place in the sixth century
BCE and is  about to commence operation.  The west and middle routes are still  being
developed. All these measures have so far succeeded to the extent that there has been no
major floods or breakouts since 1938 but the river system is just as vulnerable to a very
large flood as it ever was in the past. That said, even though the future is uncertain, the
long record of Chinese Government management of the Yellow River is one of the grand
iconic stories in the desperate struggle by the human species to tame and harness their
environment.
Colorado River
Colorado River, United States
The Chinese story of the role of the State in relation to the Yellow River is unique but there
are many other examples from elsewhere which demonstrate a similar central  role for
national governments even if not over the same time span. The history of United States
federal government involvement in the development of the Colorado River has a number of
interesting aspects. The story could start in a number of places but the role of the national
government in the negotiation of the 1922 Compact of the River is one possible point.
Bringing together the seven upper and lower Colorado Basin states Hubert Hoover, the
national government facilitator, brokered a water sharing arrangement that has proved
surprisingly resilient over the subsequent ninety years. One of the first products of the new
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compact (a voluntary agreement made under the implied threat of an externally imposed
solution)  was  the  Hoover  Dam funded by  the  federal  government  completed  in  1935.
Through its capacity to provide hydropower and regulate river flows it has underpinned the
development of the south-west of the United States since the 1930s.
The central government of the United States (conceptualised in its wider sense so as to
include  national  institutions  such  as  the  Supreme  Court)  has  subsequently  shaped
development in the region by funding strategic projects such as the Central Arizona Project,
influencing  water  management  plans  through  legislative  requirements  such  as  the
Endangered Species Act and arbitrating disputes between the Colorado Basin states. More
recently, using an approach that hints at how its role could evolve to deal with the predicted
disruptive impacts of climate change, in 2007 it pressured the lower Colorado states to
negotiate between themselves an exceptional circumstances drought management plan to
share water that would protect key assets such as the major cities. The four states acted in
response to the threat by the national government that if they did not come to an agreement
it  would impose its  own water sharing plan on them. Although the scale of  the 2007
agreement was relatively small it did provide a significant demonstration of the creative
potential of national governments to influence the behaviour of sub-national actors.
Murray River, Australia. Source: Flickr
user jcolman
Murray-Darling Basin
Confronted by a rather similar deadlock in the Murray-Darling Basin in the 2000s the
Australian Government undertook a direct takeover of water management responsibilities
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through the Water Act 2007. The previous arrangement, in place for over ninety years, had
been a confederate pact put in place by parallel legislation in all jurisdictions and glued
together by the periodic injection of Commonwealth or national government funds and the
vague threat of legal action by South Australia in the High Court. Known in its post 1980s
version as the MDB Initiative, by the mid-2000s it had clearly stalled in its capacity to
manage increasing  development  pressure,  severe  drought  and the  prospect  of  climate
change.  The national government with its financial resources and basin wide reach was
clearly the only government in a position to organise a collective response. It did this by
introducing legislation that gave it responsibility for policy through an overall Basin Plan
with  implementation  being  delegated  to  the  states  in  their  respective  sections  of  the
catchment. This created a situation where the national government will be able to blame
bad outcomes on poor implementation and conversely the states will be able to point to
inappropriate,  ignorant,  inadequate  or  poorly  resourced  policy.  Under  the  previous
arrangement states shared collective responsibility for policy. A direct takeover was not the
only  option available  to  the national  government.  It  could,  for  example,  have used its
financial leverage to pressure the Basin states to accept four out of five majority decisions
on the MDB Ministerial Council, thereby getting rid of the requirement for unanimity. This
would have meant that any government wanting to block a decision would need the support
of at least one other government rather than just asserting a veto which they did not have to
justify. That would have fundamentally changed the dynamics of high level decision making
in the MDB. There may be faults with the argument just put forward but it illustrates the
more fundamental point that there should have been a more wide ranging public discussion
about institutional design before the national government imposed its new model.
Conclusion
This opening opinion piece for our International Water Politics short lecture series has two
aims. The first is to focus attention on the unique and central role of national governments
in relation to the management of large rivers and the second is to open up discussion about
how that  role  should be exercised.  In  the comparison between the United States  and
Australia for example it could be argued that the United States federal government took its
more restrained approach because the political opposition to its presence in the south-west
was so strong that it had to be relatively indirect in the way it used its power. The Australian
government by contrast had more public support and so was able to act more coercively in
relation to the states. It could also be argued, however, that even though the Australian
Government was able to intervene overtly and take over policy control in a more high profile
way it would have been better advised to exercise restraint and redesign the rules under
which the MDB governments interacted rather than itself take on the central responsibility.
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In the case of China, given the dangers, there would seem to be more justification for very
direct central action.
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  not  to  explain  the  past  actions  of  the  various  central
governments in ways that will cause the reader to agree with my interpretations or the
actions as described but rather to break through the dominant narratives about central
governments and provoke readers to think about alternatives. We cannot change the past
but we can change our understanding of it and that can affect our thinking about future
options.
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